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Abstract
Energy storage can provide a variety of economic
and reliability benefits to the grid; however, the
overall environmental impacts of storage are not always
positive, as some studies have shown. In this paper,
we explore the long-term impacts of using storage to
provide frequency regulation. Specifically, using an
optimization model that co-optimizes unit commitment,
energy, and regulation capacity, we explore the effect of
increasing penetrations of regulation-providing storage
on dispatch, prices, profit, retirements, and long-term
system-wide CO2 emissions. We also investigate how the
impacts change when retired generators are replaced
by renewables. We find that storage can lead to
increases or decreases in emissions, depending on
system parameters and whether renewables replace
retired capacity. Additionally, we find that long-term
impacts can be in different directions than short-term
impacts. This points to the need for new mechanisms
to ensure desired environmental outcomes are achieved
when using so-called “green” technologies.
Nomenclature
ag, bg, cg Quadratic heat rate curve coefficients of
generator g
Bij Susceptance of line ij
Eg CO2 emissions rate of generator g
fg Energy cost function of generator g
kfg Fuel price of generator g
krg, k
r




g Variable and fixed O&M costs of
generator g
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pg Power generation of generator g
Pmaxg , P
min
g Maximum and minimum power
generation limits of generator g
pfij Power flow on line ij
P f,maxij Maximum power flow limit on line ij
P loadi , P
load,s
i Load and storage-induced load at bus i




s Maximum regulation capacity of
generator g and storage s
Rreq Regulation requirement
ug Unit commitment status of generator g
yg Hourly operating profits of generator g
β Storage-induced load coefficient
θi Voltage angle of bus i
θmaxi , θ
min
i Maximum and minimum voltage angle
limits of bus i
θref Voltage angle reference
πp, πr System-wide energy and regulation
prices
1. Introduction
Technological improvements and a decline in cost
have increased integration of energy storage into power
systems. In particular, battery storage is highly
flexible and able to provide high-value power systems
services [1] such as frequency regulation, also known
as secondary frequency control and henceforth referred
to as simply regulation. The US Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) has also created





favorable market conditions for storage. Since FERC
Order 755 [2], which requires Independent System
Operators (ISOs) to compensate regulation providers
for both capacity and performance, large-scale battery
storage capacity in the US has increased from 59 MW in
2010 to more than 1 GW in 2020, with 17 GW projected
by 2050 [3]. As of 2018, about 75% of the capacity
was used to provide regulation [3]. Furthermore, FERC
Order 841 [4] removed most remaining barriers to
storage participation in electricity markets, including
ancillary services.
Energy storage providing regulation helps maintain
system reliability, but it also has other impacts on the
system. Importantly, it alters system dispatch of both
energy and ancillary services, and it can also impact
unit commitment [5, 6]. This is because it replaces the
sources that used to provide regulation, which in the US
are usually a combination of natural gas, hydropower,
and fast-ramping coal power plants [7]. ISOs in the
US co-optimize energy and ancillary services and so
changes in ancillary services bids directly affect the
energy market. For example, a coal power plant
that has traditionally provided regulation but is no
longer dispatched to provide the service because of
the entry of storage can generate at higher or lower
levels because it does not have to reserve a margin
from its minimum and maximum power generation limit
to be able to provide regulation. This change affects
generator profits in addition to system-wide costs and
emissions. Although energy storage is often thought of
as a “green” technology for its potential to help integrate
more renewable energy, previous studies have found that
storage providing regulation can decrease or increase
system-wide CO2 emissions [6, 8]. However, these
studies focused only on short-term impacts.
In this paper, we explore the long-term impacts
of storage providing regulation considering short-term
changes in dispatch, operational costs, and generator
profits that in turn impact plant retirements and
long-term emissions outcomes. Our goal is not to
forecast emissions impacts for a particular system
but instead to explore the range of outcomes that
are physically possible given the way power systems
are operated and the way generators make retirement
decisions. More concretely, we wish to answer the
question, “if emissions increase in the short term could
they decrease in the long term?”, and vice versa. To do
this we apply an optimization model that co-optimizes
unit commitment, energy, and regulation capacity to an
IEEE test network, simulate the system over a 10-year
period in which the capacity of storage providing
regulation increases, and assess plant retirements and
emissions outcomes.
A number of prior studies have explored the
emissions impacts of storage. For example, [9] found
that storage can reduce renewables curtailment and
decrease CO2 emissions. In contrast, [10–13] found
that energy storage providing arbitrage could increase
emissions. None of these studies considered storage
providing regulation. Ref. [14] considers storage
providing multiple services including regulation but
focuses on analyzing the overall value of storage rather
than changes in emissions, and the results do not
make clear the value/change-in-emissions due to storage
providing regulation versus other services. Ref. [15]
shows that vehicle-to-grid services provided by vehicle
batteries could reduce emissions in Texas, but does
not explore long-term impacts. Most similar to our
work, [16] explores the long-term impacts of storage
providing energy and/or ancillary services in Texas and
finds long-term emissions will increase. In contrast to
[16], which aims to forecast outcomes for a particular
system, our paper aims to identify the range of possible
outcomes and the reasons for those outcomes. For
example, though [16] includes unit retirement in its
planning model, the direct impacts of storage on
retirements are not investigated, as they are here. Some
papers study the impacts of storage through expansion
planning models [14, 17, 18] in which the goal is to
make optimal investment decisions to achieve certain
outcomes rather than to observe outcomes based on
expected increases in storage penetrations, as we do
here. Additionally, other papers have explored the
impact of plant retirements on storage capacity [19]
and value [20], and [21] studied how storage providing
arbitrage affects the revenue of existing plants, but
storage providing regulation was not modeled.
A key factor affecting long-term changes in
emissions due to storage providing regulation is how
the generation mix evolves following plant retirements.
In the US, the Biden administration is championing
a goal of electricity sector decarbonization by 2035
[22] achievable through timely retirement of fossil
fuel capacity and replacement with renewable energy
sources [23]. Therefore, in this paper we also
explore how emissions outcomes differ when retired
capacity is not immediately replaced versus when it
is replaced by renewables. A number of papers
have explored long-term electricity decarbonization
strategies including storage and renewables [24–26],
but these papers did not consider storage providing
regulation.
The contributions of the paper are 1) to develop
an approach to explore and link the short-term and
long-term impacts of storage providing regulation on
system-wide emissions considering plant retirements
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and possible replacement by renewables and 2) our
findings that long-term emissions impacts could be
positive or negative and, more importantly, that
long-term impacts can be in different directions than
short-term impacts. We also provide empirical evidence
based on analysis of data from the PJM Interconnection
that our results may be generalizable. These findings
show that so-called “green” technologies like storage
can have unintended consequences as they affect both
short-term operation and the long-term generation
mix. Further, our work points to the need for new
mechanisms to ensure that long-term outcomes are in
line with the goals of new technologies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 presents our methods and Section 3 presents
a case study; details of test system set-up are given
in Section 3.1 and results are shown and discussed in
Section 3.2. Section 4 summarizes our findings and
provides ideas for future work.
2. Methods
In this section, we present our method to assess
the long-term impacts of storage on retirements and
emissions, which is summarized in Fig. 1. We first
set the storage capacity and then solve the optimization
model that co-optimizes unit commitment, energy, and
regulation capacity four times, once for each season
using different representative system-wide load levels.
With these results, we compute the yearly operating
profit of each generator and compare each generator’s
profit to its fixed operations and maintenance (O&M)
costs to determine whether the generator is unprofitable
and should retire. Retirement decisions are only made
at the end of each year, and once a plant retires it
can no longer be committed. Following retirement,
renewable energy sources could be added to the system
to replace retired capacity, or not. We repeat this
yearly analysis for 10 years, increasing the storage
capacity each time, and finally assess the long-term
emissions impacts. We next detail our assumptions,
present the optimization model used to determine
short-term impacts, and describe how we assess profits,
make retirement decisions, compute emissions, and add
renewable energy capacity.
2.1. Assumptions
We make a large number of simplifying assumptions
so that we can focus on the impact of increasing storage
penetrations alone on long-term emissions outcomes
and also so that we can more easily interpret the results.
• To isolate the effects of increasing storage
penetrations, we do not change load levels from
year to year or allow fossil fuel generator expansion.
For our parameterization of the test system, fossil
fuel generator expansion is not required even when
renewables are not added because there is sufficient
generation capacity after all observed unit retirements.
• We use a single-period optimization model
(extrapolating the results from a single hour to a
whole season) and so ignore multi-period constraints
like ramping limits and minimum up/downtime limits.
• We include the DC power flow equations in our
optimization model to capture transmission line
limits; however, we only present case study results for
the uncongested system. Future work will explore the
impact of congestion.
• We model only a single ancillary service product –
regulation – and assume provision of it is symmetric,
i.e. a generator must provide the same amount of
capacity in both the upward and downward directions.
• We assume storage provides only regulation.
Although much work has focused on storage
providing arbitrage, most storage in the US provides
regulation [3].
• Generator costs captured in the model include fuel
costs, variable O&M costs, and regulation provision
costs. Storage costs include regulation provision
costs. We assume each generator incurs a fixed O&M
cost at the end of every year, modeled as constant over
time.
• The model is a mixed-integer quadratic program
(MIQP), and therefore nonconvex. For our profit
analysis, we need energy and regulation prices,
which, if the problem were convex, would be the
Lagrange multipliers of certain constraints. However,
Lagrange multipliers are not well-defined for MIQPs.
Therefore, we solve the MIQP to obtain the optimal
integer variables, fix them to their optimal values,
and re-solve the resulting quadratic program (QP) to
obtain the prices.
• We assume the regulation signal is approximately
energy neutral, i.e., resources are dispatched upwards
as often as downwards. This means that storage
starting the hour at 50% state of charge will end the
hour at approximately 50% state of charge with the
exception of the additional energy incurred due to
inefficiency losses, which we include in the model as
storage-induced load.
• We consider only CO2 emissions and assume
emissions are a function of generator energy delivery
only. The previous assumption implies that, for
a particular power generation set-point, the act of
providing regulation does not significantly change the
amount of energy that a generator delivers. Also,
while regulation provision will impact a generator’s
Page 3531
Solve optimization 
problem for 4 hours 
in a year 











Figure 1. Flowchart of the method to assess the long-term impacts of storage on retirements and emissions.
heat rate and associated CO2 emissions, we assume
this impact is small.
2.2. Optimization model
The optimization model co-optimizes unit
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pg + rg ≤ Pmaxg ug ∀g (5)
pg − rg ≥ Pming ug ∀g (6)
0 ≤ rg ≤ Rmaxg ug ∀g (7)





rg ≥ Rreq (9)
P load,si =
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s at bus i
βrs ∀i (10)





θmini ≤ θi ≤ θmaxi ∀i (12)
θref = 0 (13)
pg ≥ 0 ∀g (14)
ug : binary ∀g (15)
where all notation is defined in the nomenclature
section. The model is similar to that in [6], except [6]
uses a multi-period version and assumes cg = 0 ∀g.
The decision variables are the power generation pg and
commitment status ug of all generators g, regulation
capacity rg, rs of all generators g and storage units s,
power flows pfij on all lines ij, and voltage angles θi at
all buses i. The cost function (1) is the summation of
the generation cost (2), generator regulation cost, and
storage regulation cost, where the generation cost is the
quadratic heat rate curve multiplied by the fuel price
plus the variable O&M cost1 and the regulation costs are
assumed to be linear in the regulation capacity, and not
functions of the power generation. Constraint (3) is the
nodal power balance equation, (4) computes the power
flows, (5) and (6) enforce generation limits, (7) and (8)
enforce generator and storage regulation capacity limits,
(9) is the regulation capacity requirement, (10) models
the storage round-trip losses as an additional load as in
[6] where β is a parameter determined by the round-trip
efficiency and regulation signal characteristics, (11)
enforces power flow limits, (12) enforces voltage angle
limits, (13) sets the voltage angle reference, (14)
requires power generation to be non-negative, and (15)
requires commitment to be binary.
2.3. Profits, retirements, and emissions
After solving the optimization problem, we calculate
the profit of each generator using the dispatch results.
As explained in Section 2.1, we use the Lagrange
multipliers associated with (3) and (9) of the QP as the
energy price πp and regulation price πr, respectively.
Then, the hourly operating profit of generator g is
yg = π
ppg + π
rrg − fg(pg, ug)− krgrg. (16)
We multiply yg by the number of hours in a season
(2190 h) to obtain the seasonal operating profit. Yearly
operating profits are the summation of the four seasonal
operating profits in a year. Yearly net profits are the
difference between the yearly operating profits and the
yearly fixed O&M cost kfmg .
If a generator’s yearly net profit is negative, the
generator may be retired. When multiple generators’
1The generation cost is zero when the generator is not committed.
To enforce this, we multiply cg by ug . Note that when ug = 0,
pg = 0 and so the other terms will also be zero.
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profits turn negative in the same year, we allow only
one retirement since retiring one generator increases the
profitability of the others. At the end of the multi-year
simulation, for each season across all 11 years, we
calculate the hourly emissions of each generator by
multiplying its heat energy (i.e., its heat rate curve
evaluated at the dispatched pg) by its emissions rate
Eg , which is a function of its fuel type. Multiplying
the hourly results by 2190 h and summing across the
seasons in a year, we obtain the yearly emissions of each
generator.
2.4. Renewables expansion
We explore two sets of cases, one in which retired
capacity is not replaced and one in which all retired
capacity is replaced by renewables. In the latter, a new
renewable energy generator (e.g., a wind or solar farm)
is added to the system after an existing generator is
retired. We set its expected generation (i.e., its capacity
times its capacity factor) equal to the retired capacity,
and assume that it can be dispatched at levels less than
or equal to its expected generation. We assume that the
entry of renewables is realistic considering the overall
reduction in wind and solar technology costs over the
last decades [27], but we do not model renewable energy
capital or installation costs because they do not influence
the dispatch results. We assume that each renewable
energy generator’s marginal energy cost is zero and we
allow it to provide regulation capacities up to 2% of its
expected generation at a cost of 1 $/MW.
3. Case Studies
In this section, we present the results of a case
study. We first introduce the system set-up and then
detail the results of two cases with significantly different
emissions outcomes.
3.1. System Set-up
We use the IEEE 9-bus system [28]; however,
we change the line limits to 1000 MW so that the
system is always uncongested. We replace the existing
generators with a total of 16 generators of different
types: coal, natural gas combined cycle (CC), natural
gas combustion turbine (CT), and oil, with parameters
given in Tables 1 and 2. We set the seasonal system
loads to 500, 750, 600, and 700 MW. The system
regulation requirement Rreq uses the 3+5 rule, i.e., the
required capacity is set equal to 3% of system load plus
5% of expected renewable generation [29]. Initially,
there is no renewable generation in the system and
so the regulation requirement is 3% of system load.
Table 1. Individual generator parameters






Coal1 1 55 8 0.054 7.23 84.50 4500
Coal2 1 55 17 0.025 8.50 70.35 4500
Coal3 1 70 18 0.015 8.90 74.02 5000
Coal4 2 70 16 0.036 7.55 55.21 5000
Coal5 3 80 39 0.009 6.85 120.87 6000
Coal6 2 90 38 0.000 8.40 75.98 7000
CC1 2 45 19 0.076 4.15 88.30 800
CC2 3 50 27 0.002 6.30 110.47 1000
CC3 2 75 41 0.011 5.43 110.90 1500
CT1 1 35 30 0.000 9.61 -0.79 800
CT2 1 35 29 0.000 9.59 1.35 800
CT3 2 35 31 0.000 8.44 5.53 800
CT4 3 40 12 0.000 10.70 -13.64 800
CT5 3 40 12 0.000 7.58 70.22 800
CT6 2 55 25 0.000 9.86 2.01 800
Oil 2 20 15 0.000 5.87 72.06 0
Table 2. Generator type-specific parameters









Coal 3 2 10 4 0.095
CC 4 5 6 2 0.053
CT 4 8 4 1 0.053
Oil 10 8 4 1 0.073
Regulation costs are based on [7], O&M costs on [30],
and emissions factors on [31]. One storage system is
added to Bus 7 with krs = 1$/MW and β = 0.038 as
in [6]. We run simulations for 11 years with Rmaxs = 0
in year 0 and increasing by 5% of Rreq each year until
reaching 50% of Rreq in year 10.
Generator heat rate curves are estimated from 2013
hourly generation and heat-input data from the US
CEMS database [32]. We picked a subset of generators
to obtain a generation mix similar to that of the
PJM Interconnection. We fit a quadratic curve to
each generator’s data between estimated minimum and
maximum power generation limits, and we scaled down
the generator capacities to approximately match those of
the test system, using the scaling approach in [6].
3.2. Results
We present the results of two cases. In Case 1,
we use the parameters in Table 1, while in Case 2,
we change cg for CT5 to 60.22 MMBtu. In both
cases, we find that the profits of both Coal1 and CT6
become negative at the end of year 5. We explore
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what happens in each case if we 1) retire coal (Coal1)
versus gas (CT6) without renewables expansion and 2)
retire coal versus gas with renewables expansion, for
a total of eight cases with retirements. We first detail
illustrative results corresponding to Case1-retire coal.
We then explore the range of possible results across
all cases. Next, we seek to understand and generalize
our results by analyzing the driving forces behind price
changes, which affect profitability, retirements, and
emissions outcomes. Finally, we present empirical
results obtained from regression models fit with PJM
data that characterize the relationship between prices
and changes in the regulation requirement, which are
used as a proxy for changes in storage capacity.
3.2.1. Illustrative results We first use Case1–retire
coal as an example to explain how storage providing
regulation affects generator dispatch, profitability, and
emissions. Fig. 2 shows the optimal generation (left)
and regulation (right) for coal (top), CC (middle), and
CT (bottom) units. Horizontal lines show generation
limits. In this case, the oil plant is never dispatched
since it only needed on days with very high peak load,
which are not modeled here. However, we do not retire
it since we assume its fixed O&M costs are extremely
low. Each point on the plots shows the result for one
season. Regulation from storage is always dispatched at
its maximum because of its low cost.
In year 0, there is no storage providing regulation.
Although coal energy is the least expensive, coal has
higher regulation costs and lower regulation capacities.
Therefore, the system has to dispatch some expensive
CT units to fulfill the regulation requirement, especially
in low-load hours. For example, CT4 is operated near
its minimum during all of year 0, providing all of
its regulation capacity. In year 2, with storage able
to provide 10% of the regulation requirement, CT4 is
de-committed and Coal2, Coal3, and Coal4 are operated
at higher generation levels in season 1, reducing system
costs. From year 2 to 5, storage continues to provide
more regulation and so units that produce less expensive
energy (Coal6, CC2, and CC3) are able to generate at
higher levels while other plants (Coal1, Coal4, and CT6)
generate less and less resulting in a slight fuel switching
from coal to gas. The addition of storage also leads to a
gradual decrease in both energy and regulation prices.
As a result, Coal1 and CT6 profit less and less and
become unprofitable at the end of year 5. In this case,
we retire Coal1, after which the energy it was providing
is provided primarily by CC units operating at higher
levels (CC1 and CT5) and secondarily by occasionally
committing additional CT units (CT6).
Fig. 3 shows the yearly net profits of each generator.
The profits of all generators decrease from year 2 to
5 because of the drop in prices due to the addition of
storage. At the end of year 5, Coal1 and CT6 both attain
negative profit. Retiring Coal1 makes CT6 profitable.
The opposite is also true (not shown). All generators
benefit from Coal1’s retirement as shown by the increase
in profits from year 5 to 6.
3.2.2. Exploration of the range of possible results
Fig. 4 shows the emissions outcomes for all four cases
without renewables expansion in addition to benchmark
cases with no retirements and with no storage. The
dark red line with diamonds shows Case1–retire coal
discussed in the previous subsection. Emissions
increase in year 2 because of the generation shift from
CT4 to Coal generators and then decrease gradually
from year 2 to 5 because of the slight generation shift
from coal to gas. After retiring Coal1, the emissions
greatly decrease because of the shift from coal to gas.
If instead of Coal1 retiring, CT6 is retired (Case1–retire
gas, light red line with diamonds), emissions increase
after year 5 because of a generation shift from gas to
coal. In Case 2, emissions decrease before year 5 when,
again, CT6 and Coal1 both become unprofitable. If
we retire Coal1 (Case2–retire coal, dark blue line with
diamonds) emissions continue to decrease, but if we
retire CT6 (Case2–retire gas, light blue with diamonds)
emissions significantly increase. For both cases, if
units are not retired (dash-dot red and blue lines), the
emissions results are between those of retiring coal and
gas.
Fig. 5 shows the emissions outcomes for all four
cases with renewables replacing retired capacity. From
year 0 to 5, the emissions outcomes are the same as in
Fig. 4. Then emissions decrease significantly from year
5 to 10 due to the retirement of Coal1 or CT6 in year
5 and subsequent retirements in the following years,
shown in Table 3. Both Cases 1 and 2 retire the same set
of plants in the same order. In contrast to cases without
renewables expansion, which retire only a single plant
over 10 years, cases with renewables expansion retire six
plants over 10 years. Because of its low marginal cost,
renewables not only replace generation from retired
capacity, but also some generation from operational and
committed generators. This reduces fossil fuel generator
profits, leading to further retirements and reductions in
emissions.
Table 4 summarizes the emissions results for all
eight cases showing average yearly emissions for year
0 (no storage), years 1 to 5 (pre-retirement), years 6 to
10 (post-retirement(s)), and all years 0 to 10. In Case 1
without renewables expansion, emissions increase in the
short-term, but can increase or decrease in the long-term
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Figure 2. Optimal generation (left) and regulation (right) for coal (top), CC (middle), and CT (bottom) units
for Case 1 when Coal1 retires in year 5.






















Coal: -19246 CT6: -2717
Figure 3. Yearly net profit for Case1 when Coal1
retires in year 5. CT6 and Coal1 both become
unprofitable in year 5. Profitable generators are in
grey.
Table 3. Retirements with renewables expansion
year 5 6 7 8 9 10
retire coal Coal1 CT6 CC1 CT2 CT1 Coal2
retire gas CT6 Coal1 CC1 CT2 CT1 Coal2
depending upon which plant retires. In contrast in Case
2, emissions decrease in the short-term but, similar
to Case 1, can increase or decrease in the long-term.
In both Cases 1 and 2 with renewables expansion,
emissions decrease in the long-term.
3.2.3. Understanding price changes Generator
profits are directly affected by energy and regulation
prices, which are functions of the marginal energy and





























Figure 4. Yearly emissions for cases without
renewables expansion.
regulation costs of generators on the margin. Fig. 6
shows yearly average energy prices and Fig. 7 shows
yearly average regulation prices for all eight cases.
We use Case1–retire coal as an example to explain
why energy and regulation prices change over time.
In this case, energy prices decrease from year 0 to 1,
from years 2 to 5, and from years 6 to 10. During
these time periods, storage replaces regulation capacity
provided by both non-marginal generators (e.g., Coal2,
CC2, and CC3) and marginal generators (e.g., Coal4
and CC1). As a result, non-marginal generators are
able to produce more energy and marginal generators
produce less energy, lowering energy prices. However,
the energy price increases from year 1 to 2. This is
because storage growth causes changes in commitment
status: CT4 is de-committed in year 2 season 1, as
shown in Fig. 2 and described in Section 3.2.1. To
compensate, marginal generators generate at higher
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Figure 5. Yearly emissions for cases with renewables
expansion.









Case1–retire coal 4.27 4.28 4.14 4.22
Case1–retire gas 4.27 4.28 4.29 4.28
Case1–retire coal–renew. 4.27 4.28 3.23 3.80
Case1–retire gas–renew. 4.27 4.28 3.25 3.81
Case2–retire coal 4.22 4.21 4.12 4.17
Case2–retire gas 4.22 4.21 4.28 4.24
Case2–retire coal–renew. 4.22 4.21 3.19 3.75
Case2–retire gas–renew. 4.22 4.21 3.21 3.75
levels to meet the load, raising energy prices. Energy
prices also increase from year 5 to 6 due to Coal1’s
retirement, which leads to changes in commitment and
the set of generators on the margin. Specifically,
the remaining generators must produce more energy
and more expensive generators become marginal (e.g.,
CT4). Similarly, in Cases1–retire gas, retirement of
CT6 also causes changes in commitment and leads to
increased energy prices. Case 2 show similar price
trends to Case 1.
In contrast, in cases with renewables expansion,
energy prices drop after the first retirement in year 5
because the system is not as constrained; the retired
capacity has been replaced by low-cost renewables.
Further retirements and increased renewables in
subsequent years lead to energy price decreases in the
long-term.
Regulation prices are affected by the marginal
energy and regulation costs of the sets of generators on
the margin for energy and regulation. More concretely,
increasing system regulation capacity may require that
the set of generators on the margin for regulation
increase or decrease their energy production to move
away from lower or upper operational limits to access
that capacity. Then the set of generators on the margin
for energy must respond by compensating the change in


























Figure 6. Yearly average energy prices.



























Figure 7. Yearly average regulation prices.
generation. Regulation prices are therefore the results
of these combined changes in generator operation. In
the long-term, without renewables expansion, regulation
prices decrease because more and more storage provides
inexpensive regulation. However, when renewables are
added to the system, regulation prices increase in the
long-term because the regulation requirement increases
in accordance with 3+5 rule.
3.2.4. Empirical results A key question is whether
these results are specific to our case study, or
generalizable. In our previous work focused on only
short-term trends [8], we developed regression models
to determine quantitative trends between regulation
requirement changes and commitment, dispatch, and
emissions outcomes in the short-term. We use this same
method here to understand the relationship between
storage capacity and prices. Specifically, we assume
increased storage capacity causes an effective decrease
in the regulation requirement, as storage capacity is
generally used first for regulation, and determine the
relationship between the regulation requirement and
prices.
Using the same PJM data as we used in [8], we form
a regression model Pt = α + βRt + XtΘ + εt, where
Pt is the market price, either for regulation or energy,
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Table 5. Empirically estimated changes in energy
and regulation prices ($/MWh) for a 100 MW
increase in storage capacity
OLS Winsorized Trimmed
Energy 7.9* -0.8 0.4
(4.0) (1.1) (0.5)
Regulation 8.3 -1.3 -2.1**
(6.2) (1.4) (0.8)
The unit of analysis is an hour. Values in parentheses are standard
errors. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% and 10%
level, respectively.
in hour t; Rt is the regulation requirement; Xt is a
vector of controls; and εt is the residual. Standard errors
are clustered by sample week. We control for load,
retirements, quadratic time trend, fuel prices, weather,
month, day of week, and hour effects; see [8] for details.
We solve for the regression coefficients with ordinary
least squares (OLS). To explore whether the presence
of extreme price outliers drive our results, we rerun the
regressions after winsorizing the top and bottom 5% of
price observations and after trimming the top and bottom
5% of price observations. Our results are shown in
Table 5.
Our empirical results show that when storage
capacity increases, energy market prices increase
(though the effect is small and disappears after
trimming) and regulation market prices do not have a
clear trend, but may decrease with increases in storage
capacity. This is explained by a deeper analysis into
the regression results in [8], which shows that when
storage capacity increases, some less expensive coal
units increase production to or near their capacity (and
so they are not marginal) allowing some gas units to
turn off. With this change in commitment and dispatch,
gas or more expensive coal units may be marginal
in the energy market, which increases energy market
prices. Regulation market prices could increase or
decrease, depending on which unit becomes marginal in
the regulation market.
Again, taking Case1–retire coal as an example, the
regression setting is most consistent with the change in
year 1 to 2, when there are changes in commitment (as
seen in the empirical results in [8]) and when there are
no retirements (since the empirical results only capture
short-term trends). Just like in the empirical results in
Table 5, Fig. 6 shows an increase in energy prices due
to the change in commitment caused by the increase
in storage capacity. This finding provides some initial
evidence that the qualitative trends we observe in our
case study may be generalizable, but more work is
needed. We acknowledge that the setting used for the
regressions is not identical to that of our simulation
study. Further, we might expect to see prices move in
different directions in settings with different marginal
units.
4. Conclusions
We have developed an approach to explore the
short-term and long-term emissions impacts of storage
providing regulation. Case study results show that
storage providing regulation can decrease or increase
emissions in both the short and long term. Moreover,
long-term impacts are not necessarily consistent with
short-term impacts, but may be. This finding is
important for ISOs and policy makers since it highlights
that so-called “green” technologies such as storage
do not necessarily lead to improved environmental
outcomes.
We also explored the impacts when retired
generation capacity is replaced with renewables. In
those cases, increases in renewable energy generally
lead to decreases in energy prices and changes to
dispatch that caused more fossil fuel unit retirements
and significant decreases in emissions in the long-term.
Our future work includes developing more realistic
case studies, exploring the design of mechanisms
to achieve desired environmental outcomes, and
conducting an empirical study of long-term emissions
impacts, as we have done for short-term impacts in [8].
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